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T
he Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 mandated that all federal
payments except tax refunds were to be made by electronic transfer by
January 2, 1999. Such payments consist mainly of government beneﬁts
such as Social Security or Supplemental Security Income but also include other
payments, such as those to vendors.1 The goal of the mandate was to save the
government money by having payments switched from paper checks to less
expensive electronic transfers.
The government’s move toward electronic means of payment comes at
a seemingly opportune time. Recent developments in telecommunication and
computer technologies have greatly reduced the cost of electronic communica-
tion. A growing number of consumers regularly make purchases and pay bills
electronically. Despite this trend, however, there is an important impediment to
the government’s move: Nearly 15 percent of U.S. households, most of which
are low-income, do not own checking accounts.2
The authors would like to thank John Caskey, Sheila Crowley, Jeanne Hogarth, Elaine Man-
daleris, Ellen Stevens, Michael Stegman, David Stoesz, and the referees Ray Owens, John
Walter, and Roy Webb for helpful comments. The focus groups discussed in the appendix
were organized and run jointly by the ﬁrst author, Sheila Crowley, Ellen Stevens, and David
Stoesz. The idea of using focus groups to study how low-income households use ﬁnancial
services came from David Saunders, who unfortunately passed away before we began the
interviews. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and not necessarily
the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
1 Requirements to make payments by electronic transfer are also found in the Welfare Reform
Act of 1996. This Act required that welfare beneﬁts, the costs of which are shared between the
states and the federal government, be paid electronically by the year 2002.
2 We will use the term low-income to refer to people who are generally less ﬁnancially se-
cure. Though this label is too broad for the population we study—for example, even students and
wealthy people can have low incomes—we follow this convention because the label is commonly
used in this manner.
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This obstacle delayed the implementation of EFT ’99, the electronic funds
transfer portion of the Act. In particular, the Department of the Treasury dis-
carded early plans that required all government beneﬁciaries to receive their
payments electronically because the requirement would have imposed a hard-
ship on those without accounts. Instead, the Treasury instituted a strategy of
encouraging government beneﬁciaries to receive payments voluntarily by elec-
tronic means. At the center of this strategy was the creation of an inexpensive
type of bank account called the Electronic Transfer Account (ETA) through
which beneﬁciaries could receive their payments electronically.
We have two speciﬁc objectives in this article. The ﬁrst is to understand
why low-income households choose certain means of payment. In particular,
we want to understand why so many people in this group do not own checking
accounts. The second objective is to use these ﬁndings to assess EFT ’99.
Understanding why many people do not own checking accounts will provide
insight into whether ETAs are likely to be adopted.
Throughout our article we refer both to quantitative and qualitative sources
of information. In particular, we report on the results of two focus group in-
terviews and use this information to elaborate on the quantitative ﬁndings. We
believe that ﬁeld research is an important method for gathering information
about low-income households’ need for and use of ﬁnancial services. Our hope
is that, by example, this article illustrates the value of these research methods.
(See the Appendix for detailed information about our ﬁeld research and the
two focus groups.)
We start by reporting information on the “unbanked,” that is, people without
bank accounts.3 We describe who they are and study their tradeoffs between
owning and not owning a checking account. We ﬁnd that many of the unbanked
have inexpensive alternatives to account ownership for their payment services.
The majority of the unbanked are cashing their checks for free, ironically, at
banks and other institutions such as grocery stores. Few of the unbanked use the
much-maligned check-cashing outlets as a regular source for cashing checks.
We also argue that, for low-income individuals, owning a checking account
can be more expensive than is commonly believed. In particular, we speculate
that checking accounts are expensive in part because of the implicit credit
extension they contain. Moreover, we ﬁnd that a small fraction of people forgo
bank accounts because their creditors can seize their bank account balances to
satisfy debts. For these reasons, we conclude that forgoing the use of a check-
ing account is a rational decision for many of the unbanked. Furthermore, our
analysis suggests that ETAs will not be widely adopted by the unbanked.
3 Throughout this article, bank accounts will refer to accounts held at banks, thrifts, and
credit unions.       
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1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE UNBANKED
There is a surprisingly large percentage of the population that does not own an
account at a depository institution. According to the Federal Reserve’s triennial
Survey of Consumer Finances in 1995, 13 percent of households (roughly 13
million of them) had no bank accounts of any kind and 15 percent did not
own checking accounts.4 These numbers have ﬂuctuated somewhat over time.
In the 1977 survey, 9 percent of households did not own bank accounts while
in the 1989 survey, the number rose to 15 percent (Kennickell, Starr-McCluer,
and Sunden 1997).5
Likewise, many recipients of government beneﬁts are unbanked. According
to Hawke (1997), the number is at least 10 million. Many of these beneﬁciaries
receive their beneﬁts from the Social Security Administration (SSA) and the
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs. We do not know the breakdown
of the unbanked by each of these programs, but we do know the number of
payments each agency makes by check; presumably these two numbers are
positively related. For example, the SSA program distributes beneﬁts to 44
million people: Over the six-month period from October 1, 1998, to March 31,
1999, it made 270 million payments, 25 percent of which were by check. The
SSI program distributes beneﬁts to 6 million people and, over the same period,
it made 40 million payments, 54 percent of which were by check. It is worth
noting that the SSI program mainly distributes beneﬁts to low-income people,
which, as we will see, is the demographic group most likely not to own an
account.
Sources of Information
In general, little information has previously been published about the unbanked.
The Fed’s Survey of Consumer Finances, which collects detailed information
on ﬁnancial asset holdings of U.S. families every three years, is useful for de-
termining the characteristics of the unbanked because it collects demographic
information and data about checking account ownership.6 It does not collect
information, however, about how the unbanked make and receive payments.
For details on payment methods, we sought answers from three special-
ized surveys and from ﬁeldwork. The ﬁrst survey was one conducted by John
Caskey, as reported in Caskey (1997). His telephone survey asked 900 people
4 Other data sources give estimates of the unbanked that range from 8 percent to 20 percent.
See Hogarth and O’Donnell (1999) for a summary of these sources.
5 As this article went to press, the 1998 numbers were released. The survey found that the
number of households without checking accounts had dropped to 13.2 percent (Kennickell, Starr-
McCluer, and Surette 2000).
6 For more information on the Survey of Consumer Finances and for ﬁndings from the 1995
survey see Kennickell, Starr-McCluer, and Sunden (1997).     
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with incomes less than $25,000 about their use of the “alternative ﬁnancial sec-
tor,” e.g., check-cashing outlets, pawnshops, and consumer ﬁnance companies.
The survey was conducted in only three locations (Atlanta, Oklahoma City, and
a group of ﬁve smaller Pennsylvania cities), so it is not clear how representative
its results are. Nonetheless, the results are valuable for our purposes because
the survey was designed to answer questions similar to ours.
The second specialized survey was conducted by Booz, Allen & Hamilton
and Shugoll Research (1997). The Treasury commissioned this group to obtain
information about the banking patterns of government beneﬁciaries. Like the
Caskey survey, it measures variables that are of interest to us, though some
caution should be used in interpreting its statistics. The survey oversamples the
smaller government programs, undersamples the larger SSA and SSI programs,
and does not adjust the reported results for these sampling rates. Furthermore,
this survey was administered in two parts, a telephone survey followed by a
mail survey of people whose telephone numbers were unavailable. The mail
survey is particularly signiﬁcant for our purposes because low-income people,
who comprise most of the unbanked, are less likely to own a phone. Because
the results differed so often between the two types of surveys, we report the
results from each separately.
The third survey, also prepared for the Treasury, is Dove (1999), which
studied the banking patterns of government beneﬁciaries. This survey was ad-
ministered by mail and received 385 responses from individuals without bank
accounts.
Responses from two focus groups constitute our ﬁnal source of information.
Focus group participants, drawn from two Richmond area low-income hous-
ing developments, were asked questions about their use of ﬁnancial services,
including payment services.7
Although information from sources such as focus groups are qualitative
and not easily quantiﬁed, it can be useful in several ways. First, good qualita-
tive research is a foundation for more formal quantitative research. Evidence
from focus groups and other qualitative sources provides an important guide
for developing more formal instruments. As we will see, several ﬁndings from
the two focus groups were quantitatively important factors in the specialized
surveys. Second, qualitative research allows investigators to gather more detail
and probe further into issues than does quantitative research. In this article, we
use the focus group responses to provide additional insight into answers cited
by the quantitative surveys. We view this evidence as illustrative, suggestive,
and indicative of directions that future research should explore.
7 More information on how the focus groups were conducted is contained in the Appendix.       
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Other Not Employed 30.3
Source: Hogarth and O’Donnell (1997).
Who Are the Unbanked?
Most of the unbanked are low-income individuals. Table 1, calculated by Hog-
arth and O’Donnell (1997), lists demographic characteristics of the unbanked
from the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances. Income stands out as an important
indicator of whether or not someone owns a checking account. Among those
with $9,999 or less in annual income, 38.4 percent do not own bank accounts.
This percentage drops dramatically to 16.9 percent for those with incomes    
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of $10,000 to $24,999, and to less than 5 percent for those with incomes
of $25,000 to $49,999. Other demographic characteristics, such as whether
one is a minority, unemployed, young, or single, or possesses a low level
of education, are also highly correlated with not owning a checking account.
Because these characteristics are negatively correlated with income, Hogarth
and O’Donnell (1997) ran a multivariate logistic regression and determined
that only three characteristics—having low income, being unemployed, and
being of Hispanic descent—remained statistically signiﬁcant. The implication
is that the other demographic characteristics—age and minority, marital, and
educational status—were only correlated with being unbanked because they
were also correlated with these variables.
How Do the Unbanked Use the Payment System?
People need two types of payment services. One is a means for paying bills.
The other is a means for converting a received payment into a usable form, such
as a deposit or cash. For people who own a checking account, these services
(along with savings services) are bundled together.
Making Payments
For people without checking accounts, the two primary means of making pay-
ments are with a money order or in person with cash. A money order is issued
by an institution for payment of a speciﬁed sum of money collectible from
itself. If someone wants to pay using a money order, that person can purchase
the order (usually with cash), make it out to the recipient, and mail it. The re-
cipient can then deposit the money order at the recipient’s bank. Money orders
are sold by banks, convenience stores, grocery stores, check-cashing outlets,
and the U.S. Postal Service. At present, the Post Ofﬁce charges 80 cents per
money order.
Some companies allow customers to pay bills in person with cash. For ex-
ample, utility companies frequently have in-person bill payment ofﬁces. Often,
bills can be paid in this manner at a third-party location, such as a bank or
grocery store. The bank or store accepts cash and in turn transfers funds to
the biller’s account. The store that collects the payment usually offers these
services free of charge and receives payment for the service from the billing
institutions.
Dove (1999) reports that 55 percent of the unbanked paid some of their
monthly bills with cash, and 50 percent paid some by money order. Caskey
(1997) also found that money orders were an important means for bill payment.
In Caskey (1997), 84 percent of respondents without deposit accounts reported
using a money order at least once a year, while 39 percent reported using
money orders more than 30 times in a year. In Dove (1999), for those who
do write money orders, the mean number written per month by the unbanked      
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was 3.3. (The unbanked who do not write money orders were excluded when
calculating this average.) At a rate of 80 cents per money order, this payment
method would cost on average, $31.68 a year.8
Finally, Dove (1999) reports that 20 percent of unbanked respondents some-
times paid some bills via someone else. The other quantitative surveys do not
consider this option, and in the qualitative research this bill payment option was
not mentioned. Consequently, we do not know much about it. We did ﬁnd one
individual in the focus groups, however, who cashed checks through a relative.
Presumably, networks of family and friends are also being used to pay bills.
Receiving Payments
As mentioned previously, banks, thrifts, and credit unions are the most impor-
tant check-cashing sources for the unbanked. In Caskey’s survey, 48.5 percent
of the unbanked report that they regularly cashed checks at depository insti-
tutions. The percentages for government beneﬁciaries were 62 percent in the
Treasury’s telephone survey, 42 percent in the Treasury’s mail survey, and
51 percent in Dove’s survey. Table 2 reports Caskey’s ﬁndings on sources of
check-cashing services. Table 3 reports the results from the Treasury and Dove
surveys.
After depository institutions, the next most important source of check-
cashing services is grocery stores. Two of the surveys report that 25 percent
of the unbanked regularly use the stores for this purpose, another reports 30
percent, and the ﬁnal survey reports 36 percent.
The third most important source is check-cashing outlets. Caskey ﬁnds that
17.2 percent of unbanked respondents regularly use outlets; the other surveys
report that approximately 10 percent use them. According to Caskey, other
sources of check-cashing services that charge fees, such as convenience and
liquor stores, are regularly used by 4.5 percent of respondents.9 The remain-
ing sources are used less frequently than check-cashing outlets. For example,
friends and relatives are used by 12 percent of the respondents in the Treasury’s
mail survey and by 7 percent in the Dove survey.
Considering how much attention check-cashing outlets have received re-
garding their fees, it is interesting that these outlets are only a minor source
of check-cashing services. For government and payroll checks, outlets will
8 Focus group participants indicated substantial variation in the price of money orders. Ac-
cording to respondents, banks were the most expensive while convenience stores were relatively
inexpensive, even as low as 39 cents. Presumably, these prices are set so low in order to draw
customers with cash into the store.
9 In the Richmond focus groups none of the respondents reported regularly using a check-
cashing outlet or convenience store to cash checks, though they knew fellow community members
who did.        
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Table 2 Check-Cashing Sources (Caskey Survey)
Percent
Bank, savings & loan, or credit union 48.5
Grocery Store 23.2




Did not cash any checks 3.5












Bank or Credit Union 62 42 51
Grocery Store 30 24 36
Friend or Relative 1 12 7
Check-Cashing Service 10 12 12
Other Retail 3 10 11
Other 10
often charge a fee of 1 to 3 percent of the face value of the check.10 If a
personal check is cashed, the fee to cash it is higher still. Whether these fees
are excessive is an open question, but because outlets bear the risk of a bad,
forged, or stolen check, and because they often operate in high-crime locations
for long hours, there is good reason to think that the fees are not excessive
(Caskey 1994). Regardless, the ﬁnding that check-cashing outlets are used in-
frequently is important because it bears directly on our analysis of the decision
to own a checking account, as we will see in the next subsection.
We offer a note of caution about this ﬁnding on check-cashing outlets.
Outlets tend to be more prevalent in larger cities, particularly Chicago and
10 In addition, check-cashing outlets frequently provide services and products such as bill
and tax payment, money orders, and money wires. Where not forbidden by state law, many check-
cashing outlets also offer payday loans. To obtain one of these loans, a borrower writes a personal
check to the cashier, who agrees not to cash it until the borrower’s payday. Such loans tend to be
made only to people with stable employment histories. All reported information on check-cashing
outlets is taken from Caskey (1994).        
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New York City (Caskey 1994).11 The Dove survey reports that 27 percent of
the unbanked in urban areas use check-cashing outlets, while only 8 percent of
the unbanked in small towns and the same percentage in rural areas use them.
Apparently, there are differences between urban and non-urban markets.
Why Are the Unbanked Unbanked?
Many discussions on why the unbanked do not own checking accounts compare
the cost of owning a checking account (exclusive of fees for bounced checks)
with the cost of using a check-cashing outlet. For example, Doyle, Lopez, and
Saidenberg (1998) assume that the cost of owning a checking account with
no bounced checks is $44 per year. They compare this cost with that of using
check-cashing outlets to cash paychecks at a rate of 1.1 percent of face value.
Under their assumptions, the cost of not owning an account is $110 plus the
cost of money orders for a family with an income of $10,000, while it is $172
plus the cost of money orders for a family with an income of $15,600 (the
1997 poverty level for a family of four). Since this sum is substantially higher
than the $44 estimate, why would anyone choose to live without a checking
account?
We argue that for many people, forgoing a checking account is a ratio-
nal choice. First, we contend that being unbanked is not as expensive as the
numbers above indicate. More speciﬁcally, we demonstrate that check-cashing
outlet fees incorrectly measure the costs of not owning an account. Second,
we argue that owning a checking account can be more expensive than $44,
because maintaining a very low balance, as many low-income people do, can
often result in overdraft fees.
What Are the Costs of Being Unbanked?
As we saw earlier, expensive sources of check-cashing services, like check-
cashing outlets and convenience stores, are only used regularly by approxi-
mately 20 percent of the unbanked population. The critical issue then is to
determine how much the unbanked are paying to cash checks through banks
and grocery stores. Unfortunately, none of the surveys explicitly asked respon-
dents how much they paid for check-cashing services but the Caskey and Dove
surveys asked respondents if they usually paid fees to cash their checks. Caskey
(1997) reports that 59 percent of the unbanked in his survey did not usually
pay a fee to cash their checks. For its sample, Dove (1999) reports a similar
number of 61 percent.
11 There are fewer check-cashing outlets in midsize cities such as Richmond, Virginia, a
metropolitan area with fewer than one million residents. The 1999 Greater Richmond Yellow
Pages lists only seven locations that provide check-cashing services. However, many sources of
check cashing, such as convenience stores, are not included in this list.  
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We do not know how much people pay in fees or precisely how these fees
are broken down by the check-cashing source. Dove (1999), however, reports
that 81 percent of the unbanked who cash their checks at banks do not pay
fees. The focus group interviews provide insight as to why some banks do not
charge fees. In one case, a non-account holder was able to cash checks for free
at a particular bank because her employer held an account there. Presumably,
others are ﬁnding banks that will cash checks for free—particularly those that
are government or payroll checks of locally known companies. Indeed, an em-
ployer with many unbanked employees might choose a bank that would cash
its employee paychecks without charging fees.
One can further speculate that a bank in a small community, where fraud is
difﬁcult, would be more willing to cash a check than a bank in a large city. One
of the Dove (1999) ﬁndings is consistent with this speculation. In its sample,
53 percent of urban unbanked recipients paid check-cashing fees, while only
29 percent of small-town unbanked recipients paid these fees.
The evidence also indicates that it is inexpensive to cash checks at grocery
stores. Most of our information on their practices comes from the focus groups
and other qualitative sources. Respondents in the Richmond focus groups re-
ported that the grocery stores they frequented did not charge fees to cash their
checks, but that the stores sometimes required a minimum purchase to cash a
check. In addition, they reported that using a grocery store for check-cashing
services was not always convenient for those without a car. We followed up
on these ﬁndings by contacting two grocery stores in Richmond to ask them
about their check-cashing policies. Both cashed payroll and government checks
for free. In addition, we discovered that grocery stores sold money orders and
collected bill payments for some companies. Companies would contract with
them to collect bill payments. The grocery stores would not charge the con-
sumers but would instead charge the company on a per-bill basis. They did
not consider this service costly to provide, since an employee assigned to this
duty could usually perform other duties as well. Furthermore, offering these
services attracted customers with cash into their stores.
Finally, friends and relatives are cited as a minor source for cashing checks.
In the Treasury’s mail survey, 12 percent of the respondents mentioned this
source and at least one focus group respondent used a relative to cash checks.
We can probably assume that these sources provide their service for free.
In summary, $172 (from Doyle et al.) overestimates the cost of cashing
checks for a substantial portion of the unbanked population. As the Caskey
survey, the Dove survey, and the focus group interviews indicate, many of
the unbanked are cashing their checks at banks, grocery stores, and even with
friends and relatives at no cost. Furthermore, many payments are being made
free of charge. For about two-thirds of the unbanked, particularly those not
located in urban markets, the evidence suggests that the costs of not owning a      
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checking account are very small and probably best approximated by the cost
of writing money orders, around $30 by our earlier estimate.
What Are the Costs of Owning a Checking Account?
Both the Caskey and Treasury surveys asked people why they did not own
checking accounts. The results are reported in Tables 4, 5a, and 5b.12 The most
common reply was that respondents did not have enough money or enough
savings for an account to be worthwhile. It is difﬁcult to evaluate this response
or similar responses such as “[I] don’t have a need for any.” These responses
suggest judgment about the relative costs and beneﬁts of owning versus not
owning a checking account; they are not informative about the actual costs of
owning an account or the relative importance of different costs.
Ultimately, the problem is that these questions ask about motives, and the
answers are less reliable than those to questions that require factual responses.
For this reason, we will only mention the survey responses when we feel they
are useful.
Some Speculation
We speculate that overdrafts are an important reason that checking accounts are
unappealing to the unbanked. The possibility of an overdraft is a key difference
between payments made by cash and personal checks: No credit is extended
with cash payments, but credit is extended, albeit short term, when payments
are made by personal check.13 Overdrafts, because they do not include check-
writing services, are not possible with ETAs. If our speculation is correct,
removing check writing from the standard checking account has value.
From a customer’s perspective, overdraft fees could be a signiﬁcant de-
terrent to owning an account. While overdraft fees are avoidable, overdrawing
an account is easier to control in theory than in practice, particularly for an
account that is frequently near a zero balance. One miscalculation that results
12 The two Treasury surveys are not directly comparable. Unlike the mail survey, the tele-
phone survey did not give respondents a list of answers from which to choose. However, in the
telephone survey respondents were also asked if they agreed whether the following reasons were
important for not owning a checking account. Included were “bank fees are too high,” “I have
no need for bank services,” “I don’t want anyone else to have records of how much money I
have,” “I don’t trust banks with my money,” “bank hours don’t match my schedule,” and “there
are no banks conveniently located near me.” At least 20 percent of respondents strongly agreed
that each reason was important while the highest number, 40 percent, reported “bank fees are too
high.” The differences between the aided and unaided responses are a bit troubling. We do not
have a theory for this discrepancy and feel that more focused investigation through qualitative
methods is warranted.
13 Technically, the retailer is extending the credit since a bank may return a check for
insufﬁcient funds. However, the bank could still accept the check, and in that case it would bear
the risk.        
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Table 4 Reasons for Not Owning a Deposit Account (Caskey survey)
Survey Responses Percent
Bank account fees are too high 23.1
Fees considered to be the biggest problem




Banks require too much money just to open an account 22.1
Don’t need account because we have no savings 53.3
Not comfortable dealing with banks 17.6
No banks have convenient hours or location 8.5
Banks won’t let us open an account 9.5
We want to keep our ﬁnancial records private 21.6
in two overdrawn check charges can produce a memorably expensive ﬁnancial
experience. For example, a bank’s overdraft fees can range from $20 to $35
per check, while merchants will often charge an additional fee.
There is some support in the surveys that overdraft fees deter the unbanked
from choosing to own an account. In the Treasury’s mail survey, 13 percent
of the respondents cited problems managing their money as a reason for not
owning a bank account.14 (In the Treasury’s mail survey, respondents could
explicitly choose this option; in the telephone survey, respondents could only
give unsolicited reports of this response.) Also, 28 percent of respondents in
the Caskey survey who complained about fees said that overdraft fees were
their main concern.
In the focus groups and other qualitative information sources, money man-
agement problems were frequently considered important. Our discussions with
bank staff underscored the greater likelihood of signiﬁcant overdrafts on low-
balance accounts, as compared to those with a higher balance. Often with
overdrafts, the low-balance account holder tends to close the account, while
a high-balance account holder simply pays the service charges. In the Rich-
mond focus groups, several unbanked participants reported that they previously
owned bank accounts and suffered losses from overdrawn accounts. Over-
draft problems may help explain Caskey’s notable ﬁnding that 70.7 percent
of the unbanked previously had checking accounts.15 Admittedly, our analysis
at this point is merely speculation. However, we feel the connection between
14 Innumeracy could be one reason for money management problems.
15 Another argument is that increases in fees explain why account ownership rates decline.
Stegman (1999) argues that banks began to charge fees to low-balance customers because of
changes in the regulatory environment.        
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Table 5a Reasons for Not Owning a Deposit Account
(Treasury’s telephone survey)
Survey Responses Percent
Don’t have enough money to justify/make worthwhile 47
Don’t have need for any 21
Fees/costs are too high 6
Problems with managing an account 3
Don’t know 20
Table 5b Reasons for Not Owning a Deposit Account
(Treasury’s mail survey)
Survey Responses Percent
Don’t have enough money to justify/make worthwhile 67
Don’t have need for any 27
Fees/costs are too high 24
Problems with managing an account 13
Use another person’s account 11
Poor credit history/turned down for one 10
Banks inconveniently located 4
Difﬁcult to get to a bank 4
Keep records private from government 4
Don’t want money frozen in event of divorce/lawsuit/judgment 4
overdrafts, bank fees, and the decision to own a checking account is worth
further investigation.16
In some cases, we can identify speciﬁc reasons that respondents do not
own a checking account. For some people, the fact that creditors could access
a debtor’s bank account is reason enough not to own such an account. For
example, if someone defaults on a debt, creditors may attach the defaulter’s
bank account. This concern, primarily raised in the focus groups, is only mildly
apparent in the Treasury’s surveys. In Caskey’s survey, however, 21.6 percent
mentioned privacy as a reason for not owning a checking account. Presumably,
this reason includes fear of attachment, though it could also include motives
such as evading taxes, avoiding the savings limitations on welfare beneﬁcia-
ries (Edin and Lein 1997), or hiding income from other household members.
16 Interestingly, roughly 10 percent of respondents in the Caskey and Dove surveys reported
that banks would not accept them as customers.   
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Furthermore, it is worth noting that even though federal beneﬁts are protected
from attachment by law, in practice the depositor is responsible for proving
that the particular funds may not be attached. When beneﬁts are commingled
with other funds, determining which funds are protected and which are not can
be complicated, effectively making it too costly for a low-income individual to
stop the attachment.
Finally, some have argued that there are people who do not have accounts
because (1) banks are inconveniently located and have poor service hours or
(2) the unbanked are unaware of check-cashing fees. The surveys report mini-
mal support for the ﬁrst argument. Four percent cite location and service hours
in the Treasury’s mail survey and 8.5 percent cite them in Caskey’s survey.
In one of the Richmond focus groups, location was mentioned as an issue for
people who did not own cars. As for the second argument, undoubtedly it is
possible that some of the unbanked are naive about price differences, but we
are skeptical that this is an important reason for not owning an account. The
respondents in the Richmond focus groups were well aware of the costs of using
check-cashing outlets or convenience stores but still used them occasionally.
In summary, we ﬁnd that payment services are relatively inexpensive for
many of the unbanked and that check-cashing outlet fees are not representative
of the true costs of cashing a check. Furthermore, we speculate that because of
bounced check fees, a checking account might be more expensive than the $40
to $50 often estimated. We think that together these factors explain why many
of the unbanked do not own a checking account. Our analysis also ﬁnds that the
cost of being unbanked varies across different groups of people. For example,
someone who lives close to a grocery store may be able to obtain payment
services at no cost. Someone in a neighborhood with neither a grocery store
nor a bank willing to cash the checks for free would probably pay substantial
check-cashing fees.
2. EFT ’99
In this section, we use our ﬁndings on the unbanked to analyze the implemen-
tation of EFT ’99—the Treasury’s plan to encourage government beneﬁciaries
to use direct deposit. Earlier strategies to implement the plan were altered
to respond to concerns that the law would unfairly burden the unbanked. We
believe our previous analysis explains why that opposition was so strong. Early
proposals would have shifted costs to the unbanked.
The driving force behind EFT ’99 was the pressure on Congress to reduce
federal expenditure as part of the balanced budget compromise. The budget-
scoring rules adopted by Congress required that new expenditures be matched
by corresponding decreases in spending. Switching government payments from
paper to electronic means was scored as savings. The Treasury’s Financial
Management Service estimates that a fully implemented EFT system would        
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save the government $100 million per year in printing, processing, and postage
costs (U.S. Treasury 2000).17
Early Strategies for Implementation18
The Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 mandated that all government
beneﬁciaries receive their payments electronically, but it gave the Treasury the
authority to grant waivers on the basis of four categories: ﬁnancial hardship, im-
possibility, cost-beneﬁt, and law enforcement and national security interests.19
Early proposals to implement this mandate did not make liberal use of the
waivers. The ﬁrst proposal would have required that all government beneﬁcia-
ries open a bank account in order to receive their payments. Another proposal
would have given unbanked beneﬁciaries a year to open an account. A third
proposal would have required that only those beneﬁciaries who already owned
an account had to switch to electronic receipt. Community groups reacted neg-
atively to these proposals, arguing that mandated accounts would adversely
affect some low-income people.
The Adopted Strategy
In response to the criticisms of the earlier proposals, the Treasury adopted a
strategy of making participation voluntary. The earlier proposals were modiﬁed
so that anyone who did not sign up for direct deposit would automatically be
granted a waiver to receive a check instead. The Treasury also developed the
electronic transfer account, speciﬁcally designed to appeal to the unbanked.
The goal was to encourage banks to offer ETAs and the unbanked to sign up
for them.
ETAs
ETAs are low-cost accounts that are designed to receive government payments
by electronic direct deposit. These accounts would be available only at federally
insured ﬁnancial institutions that offer them voluntarily. When an institution
chooses to offer ETAs, the Treasury will reimburse it $12.60 for the one-time
cost of setting up each account. The ﬁnancial institutions offering ETAs would
enter into contractual agreements with the Treasury that stipulate the account’s
speciﬁcations. These speciﬁcations require that ETAs:
† be an individually owned account at a federally insured ﬁnancial institution;
17 Roughly 30 percent of Treasury payments are made by check. From October 1998 to
March 1999, approximately 130 million payments were made in this manner.
18 Stegman (1999) describes the implementation process up until early 1999.
19 The latter category includes law enforcement payments to informers, who for obvious
reasons would prefer not to have an electronic record of a payment from the federal government.    
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† be available to any individual who receives a federal beneﬁt, wage, salary,
or retirement payment and other such deposits as a ﬁnancial institution
agrees to permit;
† charge no more than $3 per month;
† allow at least four free cash withdrawals and balance inquiries per month
through any combination of proprietary ATM and/or over-the-counter
transactions;
† provide the same consumer protections that are available to other account
holders at ﬁnancial institutions;
† allow access to point-of-sale networks, if this service is available to
non-ETA holders;
† require no minimum balance, except as required by federal or state law;
and
† send each account holder a monthly statement.
How Does EFT ’99 Affect Market Participants?
There are four parties that have been affected by the various possible imple-
mentations of EFT ’99: the government; the unbanked, who are represented at
the policy level by low-income advocacy groups; the banks; and the alternative
institutions to banks, such as check-cashing outlets. As noted earlier, the driving
force behind EFT ’99 is the belief that switching to electronic payments would
save the federal government a substantial amount of money. The question for
the other affected parties is whether it is worth adopting this means of payment.
The Government
The government’s interest in costs and beneﬁts is relatively clear. The more
people who switch to electronic payment, the more money it saves. Presum-
ably, there will be cost savings from ETAs, even with the $12.60 payment per
account.
The Unbanked
As previously discussed, the decision to forgo owning a checking account is
entirely rational. Early EFT ’99 proposals that would have mandated beneﬁ-
ciaries to own checking accounts in order to receive payments would not have
saved resources for the economy but instead would have shifted costs from the
government to the unbanked.
However, even with voluntary participation in the ETA program where
there is no danger that EFT ’99 merely shifts costs, it is still uncertain whether
ETAs will be widely adopted by the unbanked. The critical issue is the elasticity      
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of demand with respect to price and ETA characteristics.20 Our assessment is
that these elasticities are small.
For the majority of the unbanked who are already cashing checks for free,
the pecuniary beneﬁts of adopting an ETA seem small or even negative. An
ETA holder will pay $36 a year mainly for check-cashing services already
obtained for free. It follows that ETAs may stand their best chance of success
in urban areas where the prevalence of costly check-cashing outlets indicates
a lack of costless alternatives.
Additional considerations enter the cost-beneﬁt calculations of a potential
ETA holder. For example, while the ETA removes the credit extension in-
herent in a traditional checking account, it does so at a cost in bill payment
services.21,22 An ETA holder will still have to withdraw cash from the account
in order to pay bills in person or to purchase a money order. There seems to be
little advantage to this method over going to a grocery store to cash checks and
to pay bills all at once. For this reason, Caskey (1998) argues that the unbanked
need accounts with access to something like a low-cost ATM that would not
only supply cash but also money orders. Still, an earlier attempt to encourage
the unbanked to own these or similar accounts is discouraging. In the 1980s
several states mandated that banks offer “life-line accounts,” low-cost checking
accounts designed to appeal to the unbanked, but they were not widely adopted
(Doyle, Lopez, and Saidenberg 1998).
The Banking Industry
Banks, like the community groups, disliked the early proposals. Many banks
feared that political pressures would require them to offer low-cost checking
20 The price elasticity of a good is the percentage change in demand for it divided by the
percentage change in price. It is a measure of how much demand will increase in response to a
price change.
21 Parallels exist with an interesting banking experiment that sought to simplify making small
payments by mail in Britain during the late 19th century. Although the British wrote checks during
this period, the lower and middle classes did not use them as extensively. Jevons (1897) argues
that check use had not extended to these segments of society because the extension of credit
involved in a check invited fraud. He was a strong advocate of the Cheque Bank, an institution
that avoided this problem by issuing checks with limits on the amount for which they could be
written. For example, a depositor who deposits ¡ L100 would receive any desired combination of
checks as long as the maximum amounts did not sum to more than ¡ L100. The depositor would be
able to write a check for any amount up to the maximum listed on it. This device greatly facilitated
making payments through the postal services since there was no need for change. The Cheque
Bank would maintain two balances for each account, the amount in the account, and the amount
of credit extended by the checks. When a check was paid, both balances would be adjusted.
Ultimately, the Cheque Bank failed in 1900 for reasons that included increased handling of small
accounts by the rest of the banking sector and forgeries of its checks, which were apparently easy
to cash (Banker’s Magazine 1901).
22 Point-of-sale purchases can still cause an overdraft if the purchases are off-line, that is,
there is a delay between purchase and communication with the bank.    
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accounts to the unbanked. They claimed that regardless of the technological
advances of electronic banking, they would lose money by carrying transac-
tion accounts for those who were currently unbanked. In any event, the banks
believed a large portion of the $100 million in government savings would be
a transfer of cost rather than a savings to society.
Of course these concerns about cost shifting are not an issue with ETAs.
Furthermore, in recognition that low service fees may not cover the costs of one
of these accounts, the current ETA proposal requires the Treasury to provide
the banks a one-time reimbursement of $12.60 to open each ETA. We do not
know whether this is enough money to induce banks to offer the accounts. We
suspect that this fee plus the service charges will be the only reliable sources
of revenue for banks from these accounts. The experience that states have had
with a similar type of account—electronic beneﬁt transfer (EBT) account—
is that it quickly draws down to a low balance. One study of an EBT pilot
estimated interest income from balances to be 19 cents (U.S. Treasury 1997).
Banks do have a noneconomic incentive for offering these accounts. They
may receive Community Reinvestment Act credit during the examination
process if they offer ETAs. The Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council, an umbrella organization of all bank supervisory agencies, released a
notice that ﬁnancial institutions offering ETAs will be given positive consider-
ation under the service test in the examination process (Federal Register, May
3, 1999).
The Check-Cashing Industry
Blessed with an extensive distribution network but threatened with the likely
loss of business from ETAs, the check-cashing industry is trying to ally with
ﬁnancial institutions. For example, Citigroup has signed a deal with the National
Check Cashiers Association to issue a debit card to government beneﬁciaries. A
beneﬁciary would open an account with Citigroup and could use the debit card
at ATMs, point-of-sale terminals, and check-cashing outlets that are members
of this association. Charges on the account would range from $3 to $6 per
month, with $1 to $2 fees for withdrawals and point-of-sale purchases (Keenan
1999).
Any attempt to distribute government beneﬁts through check-cashing out-
lets has been controversial, mainly because low-income advocacy groups view
the check-cashing outlet fees to be exploitative. These concerns have led to
recent rules banning ﬁnancial institutions from providing ETAs in partner-
ship with institutions like check-cashing outlets and liquor stores. Furthermore,
the Treasury recently requested public comments asking whether to regulate
partnerships between check-cashing outlets and ﬁnancial institutions that of-
fer non-ETAs (Federal Register, January 8, 1999). Some fear that a regulated
ﬁnancial institution may encourage its customers to have their government       
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checks electronically deposited into a standard deposit account and arrange for
a nondepository institution to dispense those funds. Under such an arrange-
ment the nondepository institution could then charge fees, and there would be
no regulatory control over that arrangement.
3. CONCLUSION AND AN ALTERNATIVE
IMPLEMENTATION
There are good reasons to think that the elasticities of demand for ETAs are
small. The most important reason is our ﬁnding that many of the unbanked
presently obtain their payment services at no or low cost. Still, the unbanked
are a heterogenous group and ETAs may well appeal to a portion of them. Since
this group has varying needs, one could imagine an alternative implementation
that allows for some government cost savings while still letting individuals
decide what is best for themselves: Let beneﬁciaries face the marginal tradeoff
between different means of payment. Beneﬁciaries could be paid to receive
electronic payments, could themselves pay to receive a check, or could realize
some combination of the two. The point is to have beneﬁciaries bear the costs
of the means of payment, which in the absence of externalities or some sort
of market failure align individual tradeoffs with those of society.23 Those who
ﬁnd it worthwhile to continue receiving a check will do so and those who do
not will switch. Ultimately, the beneﬁciary is best positioned to determine the
tradeoff.
APPENDIX
Here we provide background information on ﬁeld research with focus groups,
discuss in more detail their advantages and limitations, and describe how those
discussed in the article were conducted. Focus groups are just one type of
ﬁeld research for gathering qualitative information. Other related methods for
gathering information include interviews with key informants, community in-
terviews, structured direct observation, and small-scale surveys. Kumar (1993)
contains a wealth of information on these methods, including a description of
an investigator’s experience in using each method. Townsend (1995) contains
a good example of qualitative ﬁeld research followed by a small-scale survey.
23 One complication with this suggestion is that most government payments (73 percent) are
already made electronically. In view of the government’s budget constraint, it does not make sense
to pay beneﬁciaries who already have switched. Instead of offering the program to everyone, the
government could target subsets of existing check users and offer them cash to switch. The results
of these targeting efforts could be used to estimate elasticities of demand, much like the credit
card companies do now with their offers.   
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There can be enormous advantages to using qualitative ﬁeld research. This
type of research can be conducted quickly and inexpensively. Also, the format
allows the researcher to learn from the process itself. The give-and-take of open-
ended interviewing allows topics to be explored in detail. Further, respondents
may raise issues that the researcher may not have been aware of before the
interview. Another advantage of ﬁeld research is that results can be used to
develop large-scale formal survey instruments. A survey that does not ask the
right questions is of no use.
The idea behind focus groups is that the group interaction generates data
and so can itself be used as a source of data. Focus groups historically have
been used heavily in marketing, but also have been used in sociology, nursing,
and the health sciences. This method can be effective in gathering information
from multiple individuals at the same time. A classic source on focus groups
is Merton, Fiske, and Kendall (1956).
Like any source of qualitative information, data from focus groups require
cautious interpretation. Among other things, participant samples are often non-
random. Furthermore, interviewers must be careful that they do not ask leading
questions of respondents, and investigators must make sure that they are not
just seeing what they want to see when interpreting the interviews. Not sur-
prisingly, there is a large literature in the ﬁelds mentioned above that discusses
these problems and presents strategies for avoiding them.
The Richmond Focus Groups
Each group of participants was drawn from a Richmond area housing develop-
ment that is run by a nonproﬁt housing organization. The ﬁrst group consisted
of 11 individuals, and the second group consisted of ﬁve. Participants were re-
cruited by individuals from the nonproﬁt organization and were not randomly
chosen. Their incomes were low; some worked and others received government
aid. Interviews lasted two hours and were conducted on site. The moderator
was given an outline of questions to guide the discussion, though occasionally
the investigators would interject more speciﬁc questions. Generally, participants
were asked about their uses of and need for ﬁnancial services, including how
they and other members of their community made and received payments. For
example, did they own checking accounts? How did they pay their bills? If
they did not have accounts, why not?
We have chosen to report these interviews as supplementary sources of
information. Though the usual caveats apply to any interpretation of this evi-
dence, several ﬁndings were substantiated by the quantitative surveys. For this
reason, we are conﬁdent that any additional details reported are important. We
believe qualitative data-gathering methods of the sort described here will prove
to be particularly valuable for studying the low-income household’s use of and
need for all ﬁnancial services, not just those involving payment services.    
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